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Abstract
We show that every strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rule on a binary restricted
domain has binary support, and is a probabilistic mixture of strategy-proof and unanimous de-
terministic rules. Examples of binary restricted domains include several types of single-dipped
domains, the single-peaked domain where peaks are restricted to two adjacent alternatives,
and the single-crossing domain with two tops. We also provide some extensions to infinitely
many alternatives.
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1 Introduction
Suppose that in choosing between red and white wine, half of the dinner party is in favor of red wine
while the other half prefers white wine. In this situation a deterministic rule has to choose one of
the two alternatives, where a fifty-fifty lottery seems to be more fair. In general, for every preference
profile a probabilistic rule selects a lottery over the set of alternatives. Gibbard (1977) provides
a characterization of all strategy-proof probabilistic rules over the complete domain of preferences
(see also Sen, 2011). In particular, if in addition a rule is unanimous, then it is a probability mixture
of deterministic rules. This result implies that in order to analyze probabilistic rules it is sufficient
to study deterministic rules only.
In Peters et al (2014) it is shown that if preferences are single-peaked over a finite set of alter-
natives then every strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rule is a mixture of strategy-proof
and unanimous deterministic rules. The same is true for the multi-dimensional domain with lexico-
graphic preferences (Chatterji et al, 2012). But it is not necessarily true for all dictatorial domains
(Chatterji et al 2014), in particular, there are domains where all strategy-proof and unanimous
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deterministic rules are dictatorial but not all strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules are
random dictatorships.
A binary restricted domain over two alternatives x and y is a domain of preferences where
the top alternative(s) of each preference belong(s) to the set {x, y} (we allow for indifferences);
and moreover, for every preference with top x there is a preference with top y such that the
only alternatives weakly preferred to y in the former and x in the latter preference, are x and y.
Outstanding examples are: domains of single-dipped preferences on an interval [x, y]; domains with
single-peaked preferences with only two possible and adjacent top alternatives; and single-crossing
domains with only two possible top alternatives.
Peremans and Storcken (1999) have shown the equivalence between individual and group strat-
egy proofness in subdomains of single-dipped preferences. They characterize a general class of
strategy-proof deterministic rules.
In Manjunath (2014) the problem of locating a single public bad along a segment when agents’
preferences are single-dipped is studied. In particular, all strategy-proof and unanimous determin-
istic rules are characterized.
In Barbera` et al (2012) it is shown that, when all single-dipped preferences are admissible, the
range of a strategy-proof and unanimous deterministic rule contains at most two alternatives. The
paper also provides examples of sub-domains admitting strategy-proof rules with larger ranges.
In the present paper we show that every strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rule over a
binary restricted domain over x and y has binary support, i.e., for every preference profile probability
1 is assigned to {x, y}. We also show that if a strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rule has
binary support then it can be written as a convex combination of deterministic social choice rules.
Moreover, we present a complete characterization of such rules, namely as generalized voting by
committee rules.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and definitions. Section
3 contains the main results, Section 4 contains examples of domains to which our results apply, and
Section 5 presents an extension to the case where the number of alternatives may be infinite. Section
6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
Let A be a finite set of at least two alternatives and let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of at
least two agents. Let W(A) be the set of (weak) preferences over A.1 By P and I we denote the
asymmetric and symmetric parts of R ∈W(A). For R ∈W(A) by τ(R) we denote the first ranked
alternative(s) in R, defined as τ(R) = {x ∈ A : xRy for all y ∈ A}. In general, the notation D will
be used for a set of admissible weak preferences for an agent i ∈ N . As is clear from the notation,
we assume the same set of admissible preferences for every agent. A preference profile, denoted by
RN = (R1, R2, . . . , Rn), is an element of Dn = D × D × . . . × D. For notational convenience we
often do not use brackets to denote singleton sets, e.g., we often denote a set {i} by i.
Definition 2.1. A deterministic social choice function (DSCF) is a function f : Dn → A.
Definition 2.2. A DSCF f is unanimous if f(RN) ∈ ∩ni=1τ(Ri) for all RN ∈ Dn such that
∩ni=1τ(Ri) 6= ∅.
Agent i ∈ N manipulates DSCF f at RN ∈ Dn via R′i if f(R′i, R−i)Pif(RN).
1I.e., for all R ∈ W(A) and x, y, z ∈ A, we have xRy or yRx (completeness), and xRy and yRz imply xRz
(transitivity). Note that reflexivity (xRx for all x ∈ A) is implied.
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Definition 2.3. A DSCF f is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn, and R′i ∈ D, i does not
manipulate f at RN via R
′
i.
Definition 2.4. A probabilistic social choice function (PSCF) is a function Φ : Dn → 4A where
4A is the set of probability distributions over A. A strict PSCF is a PSCF that is not a DSCF.
Observe that a deterministic social choice function can be identified with a probabilistic social
choice function by assigning probability 1 to the chosen alternative.
For a ∈ A and RN ∈ Dn, Φa(RN) denotes the probability assigned to a by Φ(RN). For S ⊆ A,
we denote ΦS(R) =
∑
a∈S Φa(R).
Definition 2.5. A PSCF Φ is unanimous if Φ∩ni=1τ(Ri)(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn such that∩ni=1τ(Ri) 6= ∅.
Definition 2.6. For R ∈ D and x ∈ A, the upper contour set of x at R is the set U(x,R) = {y ∈
X : yRx}. In particular, x ∈ U(x,R).
Agent i ∈ N manipulates PSCF Φ at RN ∈ Dn via R′i if ΦU(x,Ri)(R′i, R−i) > ΦU(x,Ri)(R′i, R−i)
for some x ∈ A.
Definition 2.7. A PSCF Φ is strategy-proof if for all i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn, and R′i ∈ D, i does not
manipulate Φ at RN via R
′
i.
In other words, strategy-proofness of a PSCF means that a deviation results in a (first order)
stochastically dominated lottery for the deviating agent.
For PSCFs Φj, j = 1, . . . , k and nonnegative numbers λj, j = 1, . . . , k, summing to 1, we define
the PSCF Φ =
∑k
j=1 Φj by Φx(RN) =
∑k
j=1 Φx(RN) for all RN ∈ Dn and x ∈ A. We call Φ a
convex combination of the PSCFs Φj.
Definition 2.8. A domain D is said to be a deterministic extreme point domain if every strategy-
proof and unanimous PSCF on Dn can be written as a convex combination of strategy-proof and
unanimous DSCFs on Dn.
For a ∈ A, let Da = {R ∈ D : τ(R) = a}.
Definition 2.9. Let x, y ∈ A, x 6= y. A domain D is a binary restricted domain over {x, y} if
(i) for all R ∈ D, τ(R) ∈ {{x}, {y}, {x, y}},
(ii) for all a, b ∈ {x, y} with a 6= b, and for each R ∈ Da, there exists R′ ∈ Db such that
U(b, R) ∩ U(a,R′) = {a, b}.
Definition 2.10. Let x, y ∈ A, x 6= y. A domain D is a binary support domain over {x, y} if
Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for every RN ∈ Dn and every strategy-proof and unanimous PSCF Φ on Dn.2
3 Results
In this section we present the main results of this paper. First we show that every binary support
domain is a deterministic extreme point domain (Corollary 3.1). Next we show that every binary
restricted domain is a binary support domain (Theorem 3.3). Consequently, every binary restricted
domain is a deterministic extreme point domain (Corollary 3.2). Next, we characterize the set
of all strategy-proof and unanimous rules on such binary restricted domains. Finally, we provide
a condition, more precisely a slight weakening of binary restrictedness, which is necessary for a
domain to have binary support.
2It is not difficult to see that such a PSCF always exists.
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3.1 Binary support domains are deterministic extreme point domains
First we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for a domain to be a deterministic extreme
point domain.
Theorem 3.1. A domain D is a deterministic extreme point domain if and only if every strategy-
proof and unanimous strict PSCF on Dn is a convex combination of two other distinct strategy-proof
and unanimous PSCFs.
Proof. First, let D be an arbitrary domain. Observe that every PSCF Φ can be identified with a
vector in Rpm, where p is the number of different preference profiles, i.e., the number of elements
of Dn, and m is the number of elements of A. Compactness and convexity of a set of PSCFs are
equivalent to convexity and compactness of the associated subset of Rpm.
We show that the set of all strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules S over Dn is
compact and convex.
For convexity, let Φ′,Φ′′ ∈ S and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, and let the PSCF Φ be defined by Φ(RN) =
αΦ′(RN) + (1 − α)Φ′′(RN) for all RN ∈ Dn. Clearly, Φ is unanimous. For strategy-proofness, let
i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn and R′i ∈ D. Then by strategy-proofness of Φ′ and Φ′′ we have Φ′U(b,Ri)(R′i, R−i) ≤
ΦU(b,Ri)(RN) and Φ
′′
U(b,Ri)
(R′i, R−i) ≤ Φ′′U(b,Ri)(RN), so that
αΦ′U(b,Ri)(R
′
i, R−i) + (1− α)Φ′′U(b,Ri)(R′i, R−i) ≤ αΦ′U(b,Ri)(RN) + (1− α)Φ′′U(b,Ri)(RN),
hence ΦU(b,Ri)(R
′
i, R−i) ≤ ΦU(b,Ri)(RN). Thus, Φ is strategy-proof, and S is convex.
For closedness, consider a sequence Φk, k ∈ N, in S such that limk→∞Φk = Φ, i.e., for all x ∈ A
and RN ∈ Dn, limk→∞Φkx(RN) = Φx(RN). It is easy to see that Φ is unanimous. Suppose that Φ
were not strategy-proof. Then there exist i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn and R′i ∈ D such that for some b ∈ A,
ΦU(b,Ri)(R
′
i, R−i) > ΦU(b,Ri)(RN). This means there exists k ∈ N such that ΦkU(b,Ri)(R′i, R−i) >
ΦkU(b,Ri)(RN). This contradicts strategy-proofness of Φ
k. So, S is closed. Clearly, S is bounded.
Thus, it is compact.
Since S is compact and convex, by the Theorem of Krein-Milman (e.g., Rockafellar, 1970) it is
the convex hull of its (non-empty set of) extreme points. Now, for the if-part of the theorem, for a
domain D satisfying the premise, no strict PSCF is an extreme point. Thus, D is a deterministic
extreme point domain. In fact, it is also easy to see that every strategy-proof and unanimous
deterministic rule is an extreme point of S.
For the only-if part, let D be a deterministic extreme point domain and let Φ be a strategy-proof
and unanimous strict PSCF on Dn. Then there are λ1, . . . , λk, k ≥ 2, with λi > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , k
and
∑k
i=1 λi = 1, and strategy-proof and unanimous DSCFs f1, . . . , fk on Dn with fi 6= fj for i 6= j,
such that Φ =
∑k
i=1 λifi. We define Φ
′ =
∑k
i=2
λi
1−λ1fi. Then Φ = (1− λ1)Φ′ + λ1f1, and Φ′ and f1
are distinct strategy-proof and unanimous PSCFs different from Φ. 
In the following theorem we show that if a strategy-proof and unanimous strict PSCF has binary
support, then it can be written as a convex combination of two other strategy-proof and unanimous
PSCFs.
Theorem 3.2. Let Φ : Dn → A be a strategy-proof and unanimous strict PSCF and let x, y ∈ A
such that Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn. Then there exist strategy-proof and unanimous PSCFs
Φ′,Φ′′ with Φ′ 6= Φ′′ such that Φ(RN) = 12Φ′(RN) + 12Φ′′(RN) for all RN ∈ Dn.
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Proof. Note that Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn implies that Φ(RN) is completely determined by
Φx(RN) for all RN ∈ Dn. Since Φ is a strict PSCF, there exists R′N ∈ Dn such that Φx(R′N) = p ∈
(0, 1). Let C = {RN ∈ Dn : Φx(RN) 6= p}. Since C is finite set, there is an  ∈ (0, p) such that for
all RN ∈ C, Φx(RN) 6∈ [p− , p+ ]. We define Φ′ and Φ′′ with support {x, y} by
Φ′x(RN) =
{
Φx(RN) if RN ∈ C
Φx(RN) +  otherwise
and Φ′′x(RN) =
{
Φx(RN) if RN ∈ C
Φx(RN)−  otherwise.
Clearly, Φ′ 6= Φ′′ and Φ(RN) = 12Φ′(RN) + 12Φ′′(RN) for all RN ∈ Dn. Unanimity of Φ′ and Φ′′
follows from unanimity of Φ. We show that Φ′ and Φ′′ are strategy-proof. We consider only Φ′, the
proof for Φ′′ is analogous. Let i ∈ N , RN ∈ Dn and Qi ∈ D. Write QN = (Qi, R−i). We consider
the following cases.
Case 1 RN , QN /∈ C. Then Φ′x(RN) = p+  = Φx(QN). So i does not manipulate Φ′ at RN .
Case 2 RN , QN ∈ C. Then Φ′x(RN) = Φx(RN) and Φ′x(QN) = Φx(QN). Since i does not manipulate
Φ at RN via Qi, this implies that i does not manipulate Φ
′ at RN via Qi.
Case 3 RN /∈ C, QN ∈ C. If xPiy (where Pi is the asymmetric part of Ri), then by strategy-
proofness of Φ, Φ′x(QN) = Φx(QN) ≤ Φx(RN) = Φ′x(RN) −  < Φ′x(RN), so that i does not
manipulate Φ′ at RN . If yPix, then by strategy-proofness of Φ and the choice of , Φ′x(QN) =
Φx(QN) ≥ Φx(RN) +  = Φ′x(RN), so that i does not manipulate Φ′ at RN .
Case 4 RN ∈ C, QN /∈ C. If xPiy then by strategy-proofness of Φ and the choice of , Φ′x(QN) =
Φx(QN) +  ≤ (Φx(RN)− ) +  = Φx(RN) = Φ′x(RN), so that i does not manipulate Φ′ at RN . If
yPix, then by strategy-proofness of Φ, Φ
′
y(QN) = Φy(QN)− ≤ Φy(RN)− = Φ′y(RN)− < Φ′y(RN),
so that i does not manipulate Φ′ at RN . 
Theorems 3.2 and 3.1 imply the following result.
Corollary 3.1. Every binary support domain is a deterministic extreme point domain.
3.2 Binary restricted domains are binary support domains
The main result of this subsection is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Every binary restricted domain is a binary support domain.
We first prove the result for two agents and then use induction to prove it for an arbitrary
number of agents.
Proposition 3.1. Let D be a binary restricted domain over {x, y}, and let Φ : D2 → 4A be a
strategy-proof and unanimous PSCF. Then Φ{x,y}(R) = 1 for all R ∈ D2.
Proof. By unanimity of Φ it is sufficient to consider the case where RN = (R1, R2) with R1 ∈ Dx
and R2 ∈ Dy.
First suppose that U(y,R1) ∩ U(x,R2) = {x, y}. Assume for contradiction that Φz(R) > 0 for
some z ∈ A \ {x, y}. If z /∈ U(y,R1), then agent 1 manipulates at RN via some R′1 ∈ Dy, since
by unanimity Φy(R
′
1, R2) = 1 and y is strictly preferred to z at the preference R1 of player 1. So
z ∈ U(y,R1). Similarly we have that z ∈ U(x,R2), contradicting U(y,R1) ∩ U(x,R2) = {x, y}.
Hence in this case Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1.
Next, suppose that U(y,R1) ∩ U(x,R2) 6= {x, y}. This, by the definition of a binary restricted
domain, means that there exist R′1 and R
′
2 such that U(y,R1) ∩ U(x,R′2) = {x, y} and U(y,R′1) ∩
U(x,R2) = {x, y}. By the first part of the proof we have Φ{x,y}(R1, R′2) = 1 and Φ{x,y}(R′1, R2) =
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1. Let Φx(R1, R
′
2) =  and Φx(R
′
1, R2) = 
′. Since R1, R′1 ∈ Dx and R2, R′2 ∈ Dy, strategy-
proofness implies Φx(R
′
1, R
′
2) = Φx(R1, R
′
2) =  and Φy(R
′
1, R
′
2) = Φy(R
′
1, R2) = 1− ′. This means
Φ{x,y}(R′1, R
′
2) = +1−′, which implies  ≤ ′. By a similar argument it follows that ′ ≤ . Hence,
 = ′. Finally, again since R1, R′1 ∈ Dx and R2, R′2 ∈ Dy, we have by strategy-proofness that
Φx(R1, R2) = Φx(R
′
1, R2) =  and Φy(R1, R2) = Φy(R1, R
′
2) = 1 − , and hence Φ{x,y}(R1, R2) = 1,
completing the proof. 
The following proposition treats the case with more than two agents.
Proposition 3.2. Let n ≥ 3, let D be binary restricted domain over {x, y}, and let Φ : Dn →4A
be a strategy-proof and unanimous PSCF. Then Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn.
Proof. As before, N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of voters. We prove the result by induction. Assume
that the proposition holds for all sets with k < n voters.
Let N∗ = {1, 3, 4, . . . , n} and define the PSCF g : Dn−1 → 4A for the set of voters N∗ as
follows: For all RN∗ = (R1, R3, . . . , Rn) ∈ Dn−1,
g(R1, R3, . . . , Rn) = Φ(R1, R1, R3, R4, . . . , Rn).
Claim 1 g{x,y}(RN∗) = 1 for all RN∗ ∈ Dn−1.
To prove this claim, first observe that g inherits unanimity from Φ. We show that g also inherits
strategy-proofness. It is easy to see that agents other than 1 do not manipulate g since Φ is
strategy-proof. Let (R1, R3, . . . , Rn) ∈ Dn−1 and Q1 ∈ D. For all b ∈ A, we have
gU(b,R1)(R1, R3, . . . , Rn) = ΦU(b,R1)(R1, R1, R3, . . . , Rn)
≥ ΦU(b,R1)(Q1, R1, R3, . . . , Rn) (1)
≥ ΦU(b,R1)(Q1, Q1, R3, . . . , Rn) (2)
= gU(b,R1)(Q1, R3, . . . , Rn),
where the inequalities follow from strategy-proofness of Φ. The proof of Claim 1 is now complete
by the induction hypothesis.3
Thus, by Claim 1, we have Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn with R1 = R2. Our next claim
shows that the same holds if τ(R1) = τ(R2).
Claim 2 Let RN be a preference profile such that τ(R1) = τ(R2). Then Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1.
To prove this claim, first suppose that τ(R1) = τ(R2) = {x, y}. Then, if Φ{x,y}(RN) < 1, player
1 manipulates at RN via R2 since by Claim 1, Φ{x,y}(R2, R2, RN\{1,2}) = 1. Now consider the case
τ(R1) = τ(R2) ∈ {x, y}, say τ(R1) = τ(R2) = x. By Claim 1 we have Φ{x,y}(R1, R1, RN\{1,2}) =
Φ{x,y}(R2, R2, RN\{1,2}) = 1. Moreover, since τ(R1) = τ(R2) = x we have by strategy-proofness
Φx(R1, R1, RN\{1,2}) = Φx(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) = Φx(R2, R2, RN\{1,2}) =  (say).
Note that if τ(Ri) 6= y for all i ∈ N \ {1, 2} then by unanimity Φ{x,y}(RN) = Φx(RN) = 1,
and we are done. Now suppose there is i ∈ N \ {1, 2} such that τ(Ri) = y. Let R ∈ D be such
that τ(R) = y and U(x,R) ∩ U(y,R1) = {x, y}. Such an R exists since D is a binary restricted
domain. Consider the preference profile R¯N\{1,2} of the players in N \ {1, 2} defined as follows: for
all i ∈ N \ {1, 2}
R¯i =
{
R if τ(Ri) = y
Ri otherwise.
3We have included the proof of Claim 1 for completeness. It can also be found in Sen (2011).
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By Claim 1, Φ{x,y}(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}) = Φ{x,y}(R2, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1. Since τ(R1) = τ(R2) = x,
we have by strategy-proofness Φx(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}) = Φx(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = Φx(R2, R2, R¯N\{1,2}).
We show Φx(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}) = . First we claim that Φy(R1, R1, RN\{1,2}) = Φy(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}).
To see this, consider a player i ∈ N \ {1, 2} such that Ri 6= R¯i. Then τ(Ri) = τ(R¯i) = y, hence by
strategy-proofness we have Φy(R1, R1, Ri, RN\{1,2,i}) = Φy(R1, R1, R¯i, RN\{1,2,i}). By repeating this
argument, Φy(R1, R1, RN\{1,2}) = Φy(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}). Hence, since Φ{x,y}(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1, we
obtain Φx(R1, R1, R¯N\{1,2}) = .
Using similar logic it follows that Φy(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) = Φy(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}). We complete the
proof by showing Φy(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1 − . For this, since Φx(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = , it suffices
to show that Φ{x,y}(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1. Suppose for contradiction that Φz(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) > 0
for some z 6= x, y. Note that if z /∈ U(y,R1) then agent 1 manipulates at (R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) via
R2 since Φ{x,y}(R2, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1. So, z ∈ U(y,R1). Now we show that z ∈ U(x,R). Consider
i ∈ N \ {1, 2} such that R¯i = R. Let R′i be such that τ(R′i) = x. Then by strategy-proofness
ΦU(x,R)(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) ≥ ΦU(x,R)(R1, R2, R′i, R¯N\{1,2,i}). By sequentially changing the preferences
of the players in N \ {1, 2} with y at the top in this manner we construct a preference profile
Rˆ such that τ(Rˆi) = x for all i ∈ N and ΦU(x,R)(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) ≥ ΦU(x,R)(Rˆ) = 1. Hence
ΦU(x,R)(R1, R2, R¯N\{1,2}) = 1. However, this means z ∈ U(y,R1) ∩ U(x,R), which is contradiction
to U(y,R1) ∩ U(x,R) = {x, y}. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
We can now complete the proof of the proposition. Let RN ∈ Dn be an arbitrary preference
profile. We show that Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1. In view of Claim 2, we may assume τ(R1) 6= τ(R2). Note that
if τ(Ri) = {x, y} for some i ∈ {1, 2} and Φz(RN) > 0 for some z /∈ {x, y}, then agent i manipulates
at RN via Rj, where j ∈ {1, 2}, j 6= i, since by Claim 1 we have Φ{x,y}(Rj, Rj, RN\{1,2}) = 1. So we
may assume without loss of generality that τ(R1) = x and τ(R2) = y.
Suppose U(y,R1) ∩ U(x,R2) = {x, y}. Assume for contradiction that Φz(RN) > 0 for some
z /∈ {x, y}. If z /∈ U(x,R2), then agent 2 manipulates at RN via R1 since, by Claim 1, Φ{x,y}(R1, R1,
RN\{1,2}) = 1. So z ∈ U(x,R2). Similarly we have z ∈ U(y,R1), contradicting the assumption that
U(y,R1) ∩ U(x,R2) = {x, y}. Hence, Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1.
Finally, suppose U(y,R1)∩U(x,R2) 6= {x, y}. Since D is a binary restricted domain there exist
R′1 ∈ Dx and R′2 ∈ Dy such that U(y,R1)∩U(x,R′2) = {x, y} and U(y,R′1)∩U(x,R2) = {x, y}. Since
τ(R1) = τ(R
′
1) = x and τ(R2) = τ(R
′
2) = y, by strategy-proofness we have Φx(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) =
Φx(R
′
1, R2, RN\{1,2}) and Φy(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) = Φy(R1, R
′
2, RN\{1,2}). By a similar argument as in
the last paragraph of proof of Proposition 3.1 we have Φx(R1, R
′
2, RN\{1,2}) = Φx(R
′
1, R2, RN\{1,2}).
Hence, Φ{x,y}(R1, R2, RN\{1,2}) = Φ{x,y}(R1, R′2, RN\{1,2}). However, Φ{x,y}(R1, R
′
2, RN\{1,2}) = 1
since U(y,R1) ∩ U(x,R′2) = {x, y}, which completes the proof of the proposition. 
Theorem 3.3 now follows from Propositions 3.1 and 3.2. Moreover, we have the following con-
sequence of Theorem 3.3 and Corollary 3.1.
Corollary 3.2. Every binary restricted domain is a deterministic extreme point domain.
3.3 Characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous rules
In this subsection we give a characterization of all strategy-proof and unanimous PSCFs on a binary
restricted domain. In view Corollary 3.2, it is sufficient to give a characterization of strategy-proof
and unanimous DSCFs on a binary restricted domain.
Throughout this subsection let D be a binary restricted domain over {x, y}. For RN ∈ Dn, by
Na(RN) we denote the set of agents i ∈ N such that τ(Ri) = a; by I(RN) the set of agents i ∈ N
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such that τ(Ri) = {x, y}; and we define
I(RN) = {QN ∈ Dn : I(QN) = I(RN) and Ri = Qi for every i ∈ I(RN)}.
Further, Dˆn = {RN ∈ Dn : I(RN) 6= N}.
In words: I(RN) is the (equivalence) class of all preference profiles that share with RN the set
of agents who are indifferent between x and y and have the same preference as in RN ; and Dˆn is
the set of all profiles where not all agents are indifferent between x and y.
Definition 3.1. A function g : Dˆn → P0(P0(N)) is a minimal winning coalition function (MWCF)
if
(i) C ⊆ N \ I(RN) for all RN ∈ Dˆn and all C ∈ g(RN),
(ii) C 6⊆ C ′ for all RN ∈ Dˆn and C,C ′ ∈ g(RN) such that C 6= C ′, and
(iii) g(RN) = g(R
′
N) for all RN , R
′
N ∈ Dˆn with R′N ∈ I(RN).
The usefulness of the concept of an MWCF appears from Definition 3.5 below, where a deter-
ministic social choice rule will be associated with it – briefly, if a minimal winning coalition has x
on top, then x will be assigned. First we formulate some further possible properties of an MWCF.
Definition 3.2. An agent i ∈ N is a dummy agent at RN for an MWCF g if i /∈ I(RN) and i /∈ C
for all C ∈ g(RN). An agent i is a nondummy agent at RN if i ∈ C for some C ∈ g(RN).
Definition 3.3. An MWCF g satisfies independence of dummy agents (IDA) if g(RN) = g(R
′
i, RN\i)
for every dummy agent i at RN for g and every R
′
i with τ(R
′
i) = {x, y}.
Definition 3.4. An MWCF g satisfies responsiveness to nondummy agents (RNDA) if for every
nondummy agent i at RN for g and every R
′
i ∈ D with τ(R′i) = {x, y} we have
(i) for all C ∈ g(RN) with i /∈ C, there exists a C ′ ⊆ C such that C ′ ∈ g(R′i, RN\i), and
(ii) for all C ∈ g(R′i, RN\i) such that C /∈ g(RN) there is C ′ ∈ g(RN) with i ∈ C ′ such that
C ′ \ i ⊆ C.
In the theorem below we provide a characterization of all strategy-proof and unanimous PSCFs,
based on the following concept.
Definition 3.5. A deterministic social choice function f : Dn → A is a generalized voting by
committee rule if there exists a minimal winning coalition function g satisfying IDA and RNDA and
such that for all RN ∈ Dˆn, we have: f(RN) = x if and only if C ⊆ Nx(RN) for some C ∈ g(RN).
Note that the DSCF f in Definition 3.5 is not completely determined by the mwcf g, since f(RN)
is yet undetermined if I(RN) = N , i.e., if all agents are indifferent between x and y.
Theorem 3.4. A probabilistic social choice function on Dn is strategy-proof and unanimous if and
only if it is a convex combination of generalized voting by committee rules.
Proof. In view of Corollary 3.2 it is sufficient to prove the theorem for deterministic social choice
functions.
For the if-part, let f be a generalized voting by committee rule, and let g be the associated
MWCF as in Definition 3.5. We show that f is unanimous and strategy-proof.
8
To show unanimity, consider a profile RN ∈ Dˆn such that ∩i∈Nτ(Ri) 6= ∅. If τ(Ri) = {x, y}
for all i ∈ N then unanimity holds by Theorem 3.3. Now assume without loss of generality that
∩i∈Nτ(Ri) = x. Then Nx(RN) = N \ I(RN). Since g(RN) ⊆ P0(N \ I(RN)) = P0(Nx(RN)), we
have f(RN) = x.
To show strategy-proofness, let RN ∈ Dˆn. If i ∈ I(RN) then i cannot manipulate. Otherwise, i
is either a dummy agent or a nondummy agent.
Suppose i is a dummy agent at RN , let R
′
i ∈ D and let R′N = (R′i, RN\i). If i /∈ I(R′N) then by
property (iii) of g, g(RN) = g(R
′
N) and hence f(RN) = f(R
′
N). If i ∈ I(R′N) then g(RN) = g(R′N)
by IDA of g and hence f(RN) = f(R
′
N). Hence, a dummy agent i cannot manipulate.
Suppose, finally, that i is a nondummy agent at RN . Let R
′
i ∈ D. We distinguish two cases in
which i could possibly manipulate via R′i.
First, suppose τ(Ri) = y and f(RN) = x. Then there is C ∈ g(RN) such that C ⊆ Nx(RN).
Now, if τ(R′i) = x then by (iii) in the definition of g we have g(RN) = g(R
′
N) and hence f(RN) =
f(R′N). If τ(R
′
i) = {x, y} then by (i) in RNDA, C ′ ∈ g(R′N) for some C ′ ⊆ C, and hence f(RN) =
f(R′N).
Second, suppose τ(Ri) = x and f(RN) = y. Then for all C ∈ g(RN) there is j ∈ C, j 6= i,
such that τ(Rj) = y. If i /∈ I(R′N) then again g(RN) = g(R′N) by (iii) in the definition of g, hence
f(RN) = f(R
′
N). If i ∈ I(R′N), then from (ii) in RNDA it follows that for all C ∈ g(R′N) there is
j ∈ C such that τ(Rj) = y. So f(R′N) = y = f(R′N).
Hence, also a nondummy agent i does not manipulate, and we conclude that f is strategy-proof.
For the only-if part, let f be a strategy-proof and unanimous deterministic social choice function
Dn. Let RN ∈ Dˆn. Let C ⊆ N \ I(RN) satisfy
(c1) f(R′N) = x for all R
′
N ∈ I(RN) such that Nx(R′N) = C, and
(c2) f(R′N) = y for all R
′
N ∈ I(RN) such that Nx(R′N)  C.
We define g(RN) = {C ⊆ N \ I(RN) : C satisfies (c1) and (c2)}. By unanimity of f , g(RN) ∈
P0(P0(N)). Clearly, g satisfies (i), (ii), and (iii) in Definition 3.1. Hence, g is an MWCF. If
C ⊆ Nx(RN) for some RN ∈ Dn and C ∈ g(RN), then f(RN) = x by strategy-proofness of f . If
f(RN) = x for some RN ∈ Dn, then clearly there is C ⊆ Nx(RN) such that C ∈ g(RN). Hence, f
is a generalized voting by committee rule associated with g, provided we show that g satisfies IDA
and RNDA.
In order to show IDA of g, let RN ∈ Dˆn, i ∈ N such that i /∈ I(RN) and i /∈ C for all C ∈ g(RN),
and let R′i ∈ D with τ(R′i) = {x, y}. Write R′N = (RN\i, R′i). We have to show that g(RN) = g(R′N).
First, let C ′ ∈ g(RN). Consider QN ∈ I(R′N) such that Nx(QN) = C ′. Let Q′i ∈ D with
τ(Q′i) = y. Hence (QN\i, Q
′
i) ∈ I(RN). Since C ′ ∈ g(RN) we have f(QN\i, Q′i) = x. This
implies f(QN) = x, otherwise i manipulates at (QN\i, Q′i) via Qi. Next, let C
′′ ( C ′ and now
consider a profile VN ∈ I(R′N) such that Nx(VN) = C ′′; and let V ′i ∈ D with τ(V ′i ) = x. Hence
(VN\i, V ′i ) ∈ I(RN). Since C ′′ ( C ′ and i /∈ C for all C ∈ g(RN), we now have f(VN\i, V ′i ) = y.
This implies f(VN) = y, otherwise i manipulates at (VN\i, V ′i ) via Vi. Altogether, C
′ ∈ g(R′N).
Second, let C ′ ∈ g(R′N). Consider QN ∈ I(R′N) such that Nx(QN) = C ′. Then f(QN) = x. Let
Q′i ∈ D with τ(Q′i) = x. Then f(QN\i, Q′i) = x otherwise i manipulates at (QN\i, Q′i) via Qi. Next,
let C ′′ ( C ′ and now consider a profile VN ∈ I(R′N) such that Nx(VN) = C ′′. Then f(VN) = y.
Let V ′i ∈ D with τ(V ′i ) = y. Then f(VN\i, V ′i ) = y, otherwise i manipulates at (VN\i, V ′i ) via Vi.
Altogether, C ′ ∈ g(RN). This concludes the proof of IDA of g.
Finally we show that g satisfies RNDA. Let RN ∈ Dˆn and i ∈ N such that i ∈ C for some
C ∈ g(RN), and let R′i ∈ D such that τ(R′i) = {x, y}. Write R′N = (RN\i, R′i).
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To show (i) in RNDA, suppose that C ∈ g(RN) with i /∈ C. Consider a profile QN ∈ I(R′N)
such that Nx(QN) = C. Let Q
′
i ∈ D with τ(Q′i) = y. Write Q′N = (QN\i, Q′i). Since f(Q′N) = x,
we must have f(QN) = x otherwise i manipulates at Q
′
N via R
′
i. This implies the existence of a
C ′ ⊆ C with C ′ ∈ g(R′N).
To show (ii) in RNDA, suppose that C ∈ g(R′N) \ g(RN), so in particular i /∈ C. Consider a
profile QN ∈ I(R′N) such that Nx(QN) = C. Then f(QN) = x. Let Q′i ∈ D with τ(Q′i) = x. Write
Q′N = (QN\i, Q
′
i). If f(Q
′
N) = y then i manipulates at Q
′
N via Qi (= R
′
i). Hence f(Q
′
N) = x, so
since Nx(Q′N) = C ∪ i there must be a C ′ ∈ g(RN) such that C ′ ⊆ C ∪ i. Since C /∈ g(RN), C ′ 6= C.
If C ′  C, then consider VN ∈ I(RN) with Nx(VN) = C ′. Then f(VN) = x and f(VN\i, R′i) = y, so
that i manipulates at VN via R
′
i. Hence, we have i ∈ C ′ and C ′ \ i ⊆ C. 
3.4 A necessary condition for binary support
Theorem 3.3 shows that binary restrictedness is a sufficient condition for a domain to be a binary
support domain, i.e., for every strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic social choice function to
have binary support. In this section we provide a necessary condition, which is a slight weakening
of binar restrictedness.
Definition 3.6. The support of a PSCF Φ on a domain D is the set Supp(Φ) = {x ∈ A : Φx(RN) >
0 for some RN ∈ Dn}.
Definition 3.7. For x, y ∈ A, x 6= y, a set D ⊆W(A) is an almost binary restricted domain if
(i) for all R ∈ D, τ(R) ∈ {{x}, {y}, {x, y}},
(ii) for all a, b ∈ {x, y}, a 6= b, suppose that there are zR ∈ U(b, R) \ {a, b} for all R ∈ Da such
that zRRzR′ for all R,R
′ ∈ Da; then not both (a) and (b) can hold, where
(a) for each R′ ∈ Db, either zR ∈ U(a,R′) for all R ∈ Da, or zR 6∈ U(a,R′) for all R ∈ Da,
(b) there exists R′ ∈ Db such that zR ∈ U(a,R′) for all R ∈ Da.
It is not difficult to verify that every binary restricted domain is an almost binary restricted
domain.
Theorem 3.5. Every binary support domain is an almost binary restricted domain.
Proof. Let D be a binary support domain over {x, y}. We show that D is an almost binary restricted
domain over {x, y}.
Assume for contradiction that D does not satisfy condition (i) in Definition 3.7. We construct
a strategy-proof and unanimous PSCF on Dn that does not have binary support.
First, suppose there exists R ∈ D with τ(R) ∩ {x, y} = ∅. Then for a strategy-proof and
unanimous PSCF Φ we have Φx(RN) = Φy(RN) = 0 where Ri = R for all i ∈ N , contradicting
the assumption that D is a binary support domain over {x, y}. Therefore, τ(R) ∩ {x, y} 6= ∅ for
all R ∈ D. Now assume ∪R∈Dτ(R) ⊇ {x, y, z} for some z ∈ A. For R ∈ D and X ⊆ A, we denote
BR(X) = {z : zRx for all x ∈ X}. Note that BR(A) = τ(R). Consider the PSCF
Φ(RN) = U
(
BRn(BRn−1(. . . (BR2(BR1(A))) . . .))
)
where U(S) denotes the uniform probability distribution over the elements in the set S.
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The PSCF Φ is unanimous by definition. To see that {x, y, z} ⊆ Supp(Φ) consider the unanimous
profile RN where Ri = Rj for all i, j ∈ N and z ∈ τ(R1). By the definition of Φ, z gets positive
probability at this profile. It remains to show that Φ is strategy-proof. Agent 1 cannot manipulate
Φ since Φτ(R1)(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn. Suppose the agents 1, 2, . . . , k cannot manipulate Φ.
We show agent k + 1 cannot manipulate Φ. Note that BRk+1(X)Rk+1BR′k+1(X) for all X ⊆ A,
Rk+1 and R
′
k+1. This, together with the fact that ΦBRk+1 (X)(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn where
X = BRk(BRk−1(. . . (BR2(BR1(A))) . . .)), implies that agent k+1 cannot manipulate Φ. This proves
that Φ is strategy-proof.
We conclude that D satisfies condition (i) in Definition 3.7. Suppose that D does not satisfy
condition (ii). We construct again a strategy-proof and unanimous PSCF Φ that does not have
binary support. Since condition (ii) is not satisfied there are, without loss of generality, zR ∈
U(y,R) for all R ∈ Dx, such that zRRzR′ for all R,R′ ∈ Dx, and such that Dy = Dy1 ∪ Dy2 with
Dy1 = {R ∈ Dy : zR′ /∈ U(x,R) for all R′ ∈ Dx} and Dy2 = {R ∈ Dy : zR′ ∈ U(x,R) for all R′ ∈ Dx}
and with Dy2 6= ∅. Consider the rule Φ defined as follows:
Φ(RN) =

U (τ(R1) ∩ τ(R2) ∩ . . . ∩ τ(Rn)) if τ(R1) ∩ τ(R2) ∩ . . . ∩ τ(Rn) 6= ∅
U (τ(R1) ∩ τ(R2)) if τ(R1) ∩ τ(R2) ∩ . . . ∩ τ(Rn) = ∅ and τ(R1) ∩ τ(R2) 6= ∅
Φ(x,zR1 ,y)(RN) = (
1
3
, 1
6
, 1
2
) if R1 ∈ Dx, R2 ∈ Dy2
Φ(x,y)(RN) = (
1
2
, 1
2
) if R1 ∈ Dx, R2 ∈ Dy1
Φ(x,y)(RN) = (
1
2
, 1
2
) if R1 ∈ Dy and R2 ∈ Dx
where Φ(x,zR1 ,y)(RN) = (
1
3
, 1
6
, 1
2
) means that Φx(RN) =
1
3
,ΦzR1 (RN) =
1
6
, and ΦzR1 (RN) =
1
3
.
By definition Φ is unanimous and does not have binary support. We show that Φ is strategy-proof.
It is easy to see that no agent other than 1 and 2 manipulates Φ. Moreover, it is clear that agents
1 and 2 do not manipulate if τ(R1) ∩ τ(R2) 6= ∅. Consider a profile RN where R1 ∈ Dx and
R2 ∈ Dy. Agent 1 does not manipulate, in particular since zR1R1zR′1 for all R1, R′1 ∈ Dx. Agent
2 does manipulate since either zR1 ∈ U(x,R2) for all R1 ∈ Dx, or zR1 6∈ U(x,R2) for all R1 ∈ Dx.
Finally, consider a profile where R1 ∈ Dy and R2 ∈ Dx. Note that the outcome does not change if
an agent changes his preference while keeping the top same. If an agent changes his top then the
top of the other agent gets probability 1. This proves that Φ is strategy-proof. 
4 Applications
In this section we provide a few examples of domains that are binary restricted. One example is the
domain of single-dipped preference relations relative to a given order of the alternatives. Another
example is the domain of single-peaked preferences where the peaks are restricted to be one of two
adjacent alternatives. A third example is the single-crossing domain with two tops.
4.1 Single-dipped domain
In this section we apply our results to single-dipped domains and characterize all strategy-proof
and unanimous PSCFs on this domain.
Definition 4.1. A preference of agent i ∈ N , Ri ∈W(A), is single-dipped on A relative to a linear
ordering  of the set of alternatives if
(i) Ri has a unique minimal element d(Ri), the dip of Ri and
(ii) for all y, z ∈ A, [d(Ri)  y  z or z  y  d(Ri)] ⇒ zPiy.
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Let D denote the set of all single-dipped preferences relative to the ordering , and let R ⊆
D. Clearly D is a binary restricted domain. Moreover, R is a binary restricted domain if it
satisfies condition (ii) in Definition 2.9, the definition of a binary restricted domain. Hence, by
Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.1. Let  be a linear ordering over A and let R ⊆ D satisfy (ii) in Definition 2.9.
Then a probabilistic social choice function on Rn is strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it
is convex combination of generalized voting by committee rules on Rn.
Consider a single-dipped domain where the alternatives are assumed to be equidistant from each
other and preference is consistent with the distance from the dip. More precisely, when the distance
of an alternative from the dip of an agent is higher than that of another alternative, the agent
prefers the former alternative to the latter. Call such a domain a ‘distance single-dipped domain’.
If ties between equi-distant alternatives are broken in both ways, then such a domain is again a
binary restricted domain, and Corollary 4.1 applies. However, if ties are broken in favor of the left
side (or of the right side) only, then the domain is no longer a binary restricted domain nor even an
almost binary restricted domain. Indeed, in Example 4.1 we show that there exists a strategy-proof
and unanimous probabilistic rule that does not have binary support.
Example 4.1. Consider the distance single-dipped domain presented in the table below. There
two agents and four alternatives: think of the alternatives as located on a line in the ordering
x1 < x2 < x3 < x4 with equal distances. Ties are always broken in favor of the left alternative.
It is not hard to verify that the PSCF given in the table (probabilities in the order x1, x2, x3, x4,
and 0 < β < α < 1, 0 < γ <  < 1 arbitrary) is strategy-proof and unanimous, but does not have
binary support.
1\2 x1x2x3x4 x4x3x2x1 x4x1x3x2 x1x2x4x3
x1x2x3x4 (1, 0, 0, 0) (α− β, β, 0, 1− α) (α, 0, 0, 1− α) (1, 0, 0, 0)
x4x3x2x1 (− γ, γ, 0, 1− ) (0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0, 1) (− γ, γ, 0, 1− )
x4x1x3x2 (, 0, 0, 1− ) (0, 0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 0, 1) (, 0, 0, 1− )
x1x2x4x3 (1, 0, 0, 0) (α− β, β, 0, 1− α) (α, 0, 0, 1− α) (1, 0, 0, 0)
4.2 Single-peaked domain with two adjacent alternatives as peak
Another well-known domain of preferences is the single-peaked domain.
Definition 4.2. A preference of agent i ∈ N , Ri ∈W(A), is single-peaked on A relative to a linear
ordering  of the set of alternatives if
(i) Ri has a unique maximal element τ(Ri), the peak of Ri and
(ii) for all y, z ∈ A, [τ(Ri)  y  z or z  y  d(Ri)] ⇒ yPiz.
Clearly, if there are at least three alternatives, then the domain of all single-peaked preferences
is not a binary restricted domain. However, a subset of the single-peaked domain where peaks are
restricted to a set of two adjacent alternatives is a binary restricted domain over those two adjacent
alternatives. Formally:
Definition 4.3. A set R of single-peaked preferences relative to the linear ordering  of A is an
adjacent single-peaked domain if there exist alternatives x, y ∈ A with x  y and z  x or y  z
for all z ∈ A \ {x, y}, such that τ(R) ∈ {x, y} for all R ∈ R.
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It can be easily seen that an adjacent single-peaked domain is a binary restricted domain. By
Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 again we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.2. Let  be a linear ordering over A and let R be an adjacent single-peaked domain.
Then a probabilistic social choice function on (R)n is strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if
it is convex combination of generalized voting by committee rules on (R)n.
4.3 Maximal Single Crossing with two tops
Another well-known domain of preferences is the single-crossing domain of antisymmetric prefer-
ences which is defined below.
Definition 4.4. A set of antisymmetric preferences D ⊆W(A) is a single-crossing domain if there
are linear orderings  on A and > on D such that for all x, y ∈ A and R,R′ ∈ D,
[y  x,R′ > R, and yRx] =⇒ yR′x
and
[y  x,R′ > R, and xR′y] =⇒ xRy .
A single-crossing domain D is maximal if there does not exist a single-crossing domain D′ ⊆
W(A) such that D  D′.4 In a maximal single-crossing domain with two tops, only two alternatives
come as top alternatives, i.e., for any preference in the domain one of these two alternatives is
the most preferred alternative of that preference. It can be seen that such a domain is a binary
restricted domain, so that by Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.4 we obtain again:
Corollary 4.3. Let D be a maximal single-crossing domain with two tops. Then a probabilistic
social choice function on Dn is strategy-proof and unanimous if and only if it is convex combination
of generalized voting by committee rules on Dn.
5 Infinitely many alternatives
In this section we assume that the set of alternatives A may be an infinite set, for instance a closed
interval in R. We assume A to be endowed with a σ-algebra of measurable sets; only preferences in
W(A) for which the upper contour sets U(x,R), x ∈ A, are measurable, are considered. A PSCF Φ
assigns to an admissible preference profile a probability distribution over the measurable space A,
hence a probability to every measurable set. Most of the introduced concepts and definitions extend
in a straightforward manner to this setting. By modifying its proof, Theorem 3.3 can be seen to
still hold: a binary restricted domain over {x, y} (x, y ∈ A) is a binary support domain. The main
purpose of this section is to provide a characterization of all strategy-proof and unanimous PSCFs
on a binary restricted domain.
Let D be a binary restricted domain over {x, y} for some x, y ∈ A. We use some of the notations
introduced in Section 3.3. For I ∈ P(N) \ {N} let h(I) : P(N \ I) → [0, 1] satisfy h(I)(∅) = 0,
h(I)(N \ I) = 1, and h(I)(C) ≤ h(I)(C ′) for all C,C ′ ∈ P(N \ I) with C ⊆ C ′. The map h defined
4An equivalent way to describe a maximal single-crossing domain is as follows. Start from an arbitrary preference
R and make a path to the opposite preference −R by swapping two alternatives each time, but only once on the
path.
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on RN ∈ Dˆn is a probabilistic minimal winning coalition function (pmwcf). A pmwcf h is monotonic
if
h(I)(C \ i) ≤ h(I ′)(C \ i) ≤ h(I)(C)
for all I ∈ P(N) \ {N}, C ∈ P(N \ I), i ∈ C, I ′ = I ∪ i.
The preceding definitions are somewhat technical, but they formalize the same ideas as those
underlying a (deterministic) winning coalition function: h(I)(C) can now be interpreted as the
probability that a coalition C is winning given a profile with I as the set of agents who are indifferent
between x and y; specifically, if C is the set of agents with x on top, then this probability will be
assigned to x. This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 5.1. A PSCF Φ on Dn is a probabilistic generalized voting by committee rule (PGVCR)
if Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn, and there exists a monotonic pmwcf h such that for all RN ∈ Dˆn,
Φx(RN) = h(I(RN))(N
x(RN)).
We have the following result.
Theorem 5.1. Let D be a binary restricted domain over {x, y}. A PSCF Φ on Dn is strategy-proof
and unanimous if and only if it is a probabilistic generalized voting by committee rule.
Proof. For the if part, let Φ be a PGVCR. Then for all RN ∈ Dn, Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 and there exists
a monotonic pmwcf h such that Φx(RN) = h(I(RN))(N
x(RN)) for all RN ∈ Dˆn. We show that Φ
is unanimous and strategy-proof.
We first show that Φ is unanimous. Consider a profile RN ∈ Dn such that ∩i∈Nτ(Ri) 6= ∅.
If τ(Ri) = {x, y} for all i ∈ N then unanimity holds trivially. Suppose ∩i∈Nτ(Ri) = x. Then
Nx(RN) = N \ I(RN). Since h(I(RN))(N \ I(RN)) = 1, we have Φx(RN) = 1. On the other hand,
if ∩i∈Nτ(Ri) = y then Nx(RN) = ∅ which implies Φx(RN) = h(I(RN))(∅) = 0. So, Φy(RN) = 1.
Now we show that Φ is strategy-proof. Consider a profile RN ∈ Dˆn. The agents in I(RN) do not
manipulate. Let i ∈ N \ I(RN). Let R′i ∈ D and write R′N = (RN\i, R′i). We distinguish four cases
and each time show that i does not manipulate. (i) If τ(Ri) = x and τ(R
′
i) = y then Φx(RN) =
h(I(RN))(N
x(RN)) ≥ h(I(RN))(Nx(RN) \ i) = h(I(R′N))(Nx(R′N)) = Φx(R′N) by definition of a
pmwcf. (ii) If τ(Ri) = y and τ(R
′
i) = x then Φx(RN) = h(I(RN))(N
x(RN)) ≤ h(I(RN))(Nx(RN)∪
i) = h(I(R′N))(N
x(R′N)) = Φx(R
′
N). This implies Φy(RN) ≥ Φy(R′N). (iii) If τ(Ri) = x and
τ(R′i) = {x, y}, then, since Nx(RN) ⊇ Nx(R′i, R−i), by monotonicity of h we have Φx(RN) =
h(I(RN))(N
x(RN)) ≥ h(I(R′N))(Nx(R′N)) = Φx(R′N). (iv) Finally, if τ(Ri) = y and τ(R′i) = {x, y},
then, again by monotonicity of h, Φx(RN) = h(I(RN))(N
x(RN)) ≤ h(I(R′N))(Nx(R′N)) = Φx(R′N),
which implies Φy(R
′N) ≤ Φy(RN). This completes the proof that Φ is strategy-proof.
For the only if part, consider a unanimous and strategy-proof probabilistic social choice function
Φ on Dn. Then Φ{x,y}(RN) = 1 for all RN ∈ Dn by (the modified version of) Theorem 3.3.
We show that Φ is a probabilistic generalized voting by committee rule. By strategy-proofness,
Φ(RN) = Φ(QN) for all RN , QN with I(RN) = I(QN) and N
x(RN) = N
x(QN). Therefore, we can
define h(I)(C) = Φx(RN) if I = I(RN) and N
x(RN) = C, for all I ∈ P(N) \ {N} and C ⊆ N \ I.
By unanimity of Φ, h(I)(∅) = 0 and h(I)(N \ I) = 1, and by strategy-proofness, h(I)(C) ≤
h(I)(C ′) for all I ∈ P \ {N} and all C,C ′ ∈ P(N \ I) with C ⊆ C ′.
It is left to prove that h is monotonic. Let I ∈ P(N)\{N}, C ∈ P(N \ I), i ∈ C, I ′ = I ∪ i. Let
QN ∈ Dn such that I(QN) = I and Nx(QN) = C \ i, and let VN ∈ Dn such that I(VN) = I ∪ i = I ′
and Nx(VN) = C \ i. Then by strategy-proofness, Φx(QN) ≤ Φx(VN), otherwise i manipulates
at QN via Vi. Hence h(I)(C \ i) ≤ h(I ′)(C \ i), which is the first inequality in the definition of
monotonicity. To prove the second inequality, consider a profile RN ∈ Dn such that I(RN) = I and
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Nx(RN) = C. By strategy-proofness, Φx(RN) ≥ Φx(VN), otherwise agent i manipulates at RN via
Vi. Hence h(I
′)(C \ i) ≤ h(I)(C). 
It is not clear if an analogon of Theorem 3.1 holds for the case of infinitely many alternatives,
and whether a binary support domain is a deterministic extreme point domain. This would require
a different proof which we leave for future research.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that every strategy-proof and unanimous PSCF on a binary restricted
domain has binary support. We have shown that every such PSCF is a convex combination of
strategy-proof and unanimous deterministic rules on that domain. We have characterized the latter
rules as generalized voting by committee rules. We have also applied these results to some well-
known binary restricted domains like the single-dipped domain, the adjacent single-peaked domain,
and the single-crossing domain with two tops. Finally, we have extended the characterization of
strategy-proof and unanimous PSCFs on a binary restricted domain to the case of infinitely many
alternatives.
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